On 19 May, 2024, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash after an official visit to the neighbouring Republic of Azerbaijan. The fact that this occurred while his vehicle was part of a helicopter convoy and just after an official state visit in one of the most tumultuous times for Iran has raised questions about the future going ahead.
President Raisi was somewhat of a trailblazing president. Setting a blueprint for Iranian foreign policy apart from simple opposition to the West and Saudi Arabia, he managed to bring Iran closer to China and India.
Thus, clarifications are being sought. What is going on and what path may Iran take next in its relations with China?
Raisi’s tight-rope
Unlike its neighbour the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran pursues a unique ideology that seeks to reconcile theocratic rule and the idea of a republic. To that end the country’s appointed theocratic system directly under the office of the Supreme Leader and the publicly elected system under the office of the President work in tandem.
As one might expect, such an arrangement would be bound to impose limitations on what the elected presidential body can do.
However, with the overall aim of more effectively opposing Western foreign policy, President Raisi has not only managed to align the country with major non-Muslim powers such as China and India, but has also managed to balance the country’s relations with the two, which are geopolitical rivals.
For China, Ebrahim Raisi was the best possible Iranian statesman to have on board, as they were able to cooperate deeply on common economic interests. Not only that, the union of Iran and China on the world stage proved to be a very real counter-balance to the US.
This was especially evident during the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since then, Beijing has been taking up and amplifying Tehran’s protestations against the wider global community and the cause of its foreign policy particularly in relation to its nuclear ambitions.
In exchange for favourable resource deals and infrastructural development commitments, Ebrahim Raisi was able to position Iran as an indispensable partner in the region. Particularly, as a partner that is not beholden to the US in any way, unlike Pakistan with whom Iran has come to blows over security issues.
Beijing wishes to keep its friend
Iranian military officials tasked with investigating the helicopter crash proclaimed that no foul play had been involved. While that rules out foreign assassination plots, one can identify clear beneficiaries within the Iranian political system.
A tendency to point the finger at Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has emerged. The younger Khamenei had already amassed significant political influence during Raisi’s presidency.
While he is not expected to run for positions of direct power to avoid being accused of bringing back the hereditary monarchy, it may be reasonable to assume that policy change may be on the horizon.
But with so many ideologically motivated powerbrokers in the system, it is reasonable to assume that relations with China are set to continue along the pace set by Raisi before his passing.
Indeed, in a recent meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Diplomacy Mehdi Safari, it was reaffirmed that Iranian foreign policies are not expected to change and that China will continue to stand by the partnership.
Perhaps this decision comes at an opportune time for the ongoing Russian offensive into Ukraine. Recent battlefield decisions to advance upon Ukrainian positions to recapture lost territory have required increased supplies of drones and ammunition. This is where Iran has come to play a significant role most notably via its supplies of Shahed drones.
Over this, and over Saudi Arabia’s increasing dialogue with Iran, China has taken an oversight role.
The scenario ahead
In the wake of Raisi’s passing, Acting President Mohammaed Mokhber will remain in office until the results of the Iranian presidential election starting from the 28th of June are declared.
Major policy decisions are not expected to be taken until the formation of the new government other than any special decisions under the discretion of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Any possible future government is reasonably expected to be continued to be dominated by hardliners. The question that remains surrounds the legend of the elusive Mojtaba Khamenei. Being a very private figure, it’s not known with certainty exactly what his hardline views entail.
Would the new Iranian government adopt a far more belligerent stance against Israel and the US? What would its relations with Sunni Islamic powers such as long-time rival Saudi Arabia be? What does it mean for Iran’s allies in the region?
It seems questions such as these are not things that China appears to be concerned about, but the way Iran goes about fulfilling its foreign policy goals may matter for continued Chinese cooperation.
This is where we bring up India once more, as Raisi inked a deal with the country to grant it access to the Chabahar port. The deal opened up significant geopolitical and economic opportunities for India to get close with West Asia, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean.
Despite the relative unreliability of Pakistan, one can easily argue how it may be better in the long run for Iran to seek closer ties with it, at the expense of India. Such a pivot would also help deepen its ties to China even more.
Iran’s independent foreign policy leading to economic challenges for the average Iranian and imposition of Islamic law has been the cause of much discontent among some of the populace, especially in the wake of the ‘Women, Freedom, Life’ protests in 2022. Indeed, there are many within the country and among the Iranian diaspora abroad who have celebrated Ebrahim Raisi’s death.
How Iran plans to navigate out of all those, and how the country chooses to answer the aforementioned questions that are left to be answered will be seen following this year’s presidential elections.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been on a course that China would like to see maintained for its own benefit. The strengthening of the China-Russia-Iran axis is expected to continue as long as their respective prime geopolitical challenges of opposing the US on an equal and aggressive footing remain.
Thus, China has incentives to look for ways to be on Iran’s side no matter what. For hardline Iranian leaders, China is an attractive option for a geopolitical benefactor as it refrains from lectures on good governance and ideology.
Even then, from China’s perspective, it is prudent to maintain an interest in the outcomes of the upcoming elections no matter what.
